Time is the author both of truth and right, And time will bring this trecherie to light.
(II.v. 56-60 [108-12]) Hieronimo's sorrow is his, and his too will be the uneasy blend of joy and discontent that characterizes the acme of revenge. Isabella slips by contrast into the wishful impersonality of commonplaces. Unable to find out the author herself, she entrusts the task to a providential working conspicuously at odds with the classical apparatus of justice framing the play. After this, she withdrawsthough how or when is uncertain. The two parents "take him vp" at line 65 (line 117 in the expanded 1602 text); but Hieronimo alone "beares the body away" at the end of the scene (II.v.81.s.d.). By adding "[with Isabella]" to this direction, later editors attempt to reconcile in the name of theatrical exigency the division between the two, who never again appear together. 6 Horatio's body belongs to Hieronimo alone; Isabella is left to mourn beyond the hope of justice. Robbed of her son, she is equally robbed of the possibility of regaining him beyond sorrow.
There is a curious affinity between the body Isabella cannot mourn and the body of Kyd's dramatic works. But for a chance reference in Thomas Heywood's Apology for Actors, the Kyd corpus would very nearly be a body without an author, and its author correspondingly disembodied. On one hand stands The Spanish Tragedy, anonymous in all its many editions; on the other is Kyd, whose only signed volume, a closet drama based on Robert Garnier's Cornélie, hardly justifies his inclusion among "our best for Tragedie." 7 Only in one place do Kyd's other works appear attributed to their author: Englands Parnassus, an anthology printed in 1600 and comprising 2,349 of what its compiler Robert Allott calls the "Choysest Flowers of Our Moderne Poets." 8 Even here, though, Isabella's dilemma reasserts itself: for alongside lines taken from Kyd's Cornelia, Englands Parnassus includes extracts attributed to Kyd but untraced to any existing play. The anthology teases modern scholars with the promise of chance survivals from Kyd's lost works, but because such claims can never be checked, the author can never quite be known and the promise remains unfulfilled.
There is a work of mourning to be done, or not to be done, in reading these fragments of early modern literature. This article draws together philosophical and psychoanalytic writings with more recent studies in the field of bibliography to consider the tangled questions of mourning, knowledge, and authorship that arise in and from Kyd's elusive corpus. A reading of Sigmund Freud's 1917 "Mourning and Melancholia" suggests that knowledge is perilously crucial for the work of mourning. For Freud, mourning cedes to melancholia when the subject does not know the object of grief; but whether that knowledge is possible, and what its preconditions might be, are problems left to those writing in his wake. After thinking about how that eponymous distinction and its discontents might illuminate Isabella's and Hieronimo's parallel patterns of grief, this article moves beyond The Spanish Tragedy to see how the dilemmas in Kyd's play repeat themselves outside of it, in the history of its early modern reception, and especially in Englands Parnassus. This anthology affords fresh insights not just for studies of Kyd's authorial legacy, but also, paradoxically, for recent bibliographic work that distances itself from the notion of the author. The very form of the anthology is charged with questions of obstructed knowledge and aberrant mourning; familiar lines from other settings can suddenly rise to the surface, looking for a moment uncannily changed. But there is something especially ghostly about its fragments of lost works, barely surviving testimonies to the texts in which they occurred and to which they retain some evocative connection. These elements of the anthology seem to echo the principal obsessions of Kyd's work and the critical legacy the author has bequeathed. Preoccupied as they are with death, mourning, and the interim of interrupted knowledge, his writings indicate a new way of understanding these gathered fragments and the losses they recall.
I
Of these lost works, one in particular has haunted the critical imagination. Beyond The Spanish Tragedy, Kyd is best known for the putative ur-Hamlet. Its place in his canon is one of the unrenounceable unknowns for criticism on the author, perhaps because it so strikingly resonates with what Emma Smith calls the "ghostly intangibility" of his literary afterlife. 9 "Just as Elsinore is haunted by the ghost of old Hamlet," she writes, "so critics have argued for more than a century that Shakespeare's play is haunted by an old Hamlet."
10 That Shakespeare's Hamlet is perhaps the preeminent literary mourner seems in this context like more than a coincidence. The connection between Hamlet and mourning is clear: "from one end of Hamlet to the other," Jacques Lacan remarks in his seminar on the play, "all anyone talks about is mourning." 11 The psychoanalytic study of mourning has been cautious in returning the compliment. Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia" feels at times like a text fashioned in Hamlet's image: the prince's name is one of the few included alongside various other colleagues of Freud's, yet Hamlet is here and gone at once. On the deep self-loathing of the melancholic, Freud writes that however accurate the patient's self-perception may be, he is nevertheless pathological. "For there can be no doubt that anyone who has reached such an assessment of himself, and expresses it to others-an assessment like that which Prince Hamlet has ready for himself and everyone else-is sick, whether he is telling the truth or treating himself more or less unjustly." 12 Hamlet is cited in a gesture of simultaneous welcome and relegation. Lying just at hand, the text is nevertheless kept safely on the other side of the paratextual border where, in an unadorned footnote, Freud cites the prince's question with what feels like some trepidation: "Use every man after his desert, and who shall 'scape whipping?" (p. 218n3). The footnote is, for Marjorie Garber, the "ghost" that points the way toward Freud's dilemma with regards to Hamlet: the prince is patient and analyst in one, she argues, "a textbook melancholic" and "the textbook itself." 13 The dynamic of this citation indicates a still more complicated relationship between the essay and the play. As David Hillman notes, Freud is freely misinterpreting Hamlet, who speaks these words "not so much to condemn humanity, not in bitterness (let alone illness), but out of a generosity of spirit." 14 One explanation for Freud's twist on the line lies less in its speaker than its recipient. The principal psychoanalyst in Hamlet is, after all, not Hamlet but Polonius. At this moment in his argument, considering whether "one must become ill in order to have access to such truth" (p. 206), Freud comes peculiarly close to Polonius's verdict on Hamlet's suicidal quibbling: "how pregnant sometimes his replies are, a happines that often madnesse hits on, which reason and [sanity] could not so prosperously be deliuered of." 15 Polonius's diagnosis is redeemed by his successor Freud, who insists that even a remark made in "generosity of spirit" is pregnant with some other meaning, deliverable by the Socratic midwifery of psychoanalysis. Freud seems to speak on both sides of these characters' fractious badinage in Hamlet. If, according to Adam Phillips's distinction, the post-Freudian Freud is Hamlet himself, then Polonius is a representative of the Enlightenment Freud. 16 Freud's essay circles around the diagnostic terms Polonius introduces in a speech often taken as characteristic babbling: Mad let vs graunt him then, and now remaines That we find out the cause of this effect, Or rather say, the cause of this defect, For this effect defectiue comes by cause. 17 One could with a little flippancy paraphrase Freud's argument in these same terms. Mourning and melancholia share the same cause but represent respectively its effect and its defect, or "effect defectiue." Though both mark a seismic modification of ordinary life, only this latter is termed pathological. We never send for the doctor in cases of mourning, Freud writes, simply because "we are so easily able to explain it … We rely on it being overcome after a certain period of time, and consider interfering with it to be pointless, or even damaging" (p. 204).
What distinguishes the two is the question of ending, of mourning's being "overcome" in time. Its painful but finite duration is explained as easily as its cause. Freud, without "stretching a point," describes it thus:
reality-testing has revealed that the beloved object no longer exists, and demands that the libido as a whole sever its bonds with that object. An understandable tendency arises to counter this-it may be generally observed that people are reluctant to abandon a libido position, even if a substitute is already beckoning … Normally, respect for reality carries the day. But its task cannot be accomplished immediately. It is now carried out piecemeal at great expenditure of time and investment of energy, and the lost object persists in the psyche. Each individual memory and expectation in which the libido was connected to the object is adjusted and hyper-invested, leading to its detachment from the libido.
(pp. 204-5)
Mourning's unhappiness is that the subject holds close an object that no longer exists, and the result of its piecemeal work is the dialectical redemption of both. The subject is left "free and uninhibited" (p. 205); the object is sublated into a memorial cleansed of still-tender cathexis. Mourning's work has a propulsive narrative, however eccentric it may feel. Melancholia is the defective response to the same cause. With no discernible whole to which its moments add up, that cause is frequently obscured, as, for instance, when "the loss that is the cause of the melancholia is known to the subject, when he knows who it is, but not what it is about that person that he has lost. So the obvious thing is for us somehow to relate melancholia to the loss of an object that is withdrawn from consciousness, unlike mourning, in which no aspect of the loss is unconscious" (p. 205).
It remains unclear what it means to know, or not to know, the object of loss. Asking whether mourners know whom they have lost seems nonsensically trivial a page earlier, where mourning can be "so easily" explained. Here, where mourning is the reac-tion in which no aspect of the loss is unconscious, the question seems nonsensical in another sense, demanding a standard of knowledge impossible to fulfill. Here is the same divergence Adam Phillips finds in Freud's thought. "For the Enlightenment Freud psychoanalysis, with its quasi-scientific terminology, was essentially about knowing"; for the post-Freudian Freud, knowing remains essentially unfathomable. 18 The word "object" in Freud's essay defuses this epistemological worry by prescribing in advance the discrete, fixed quality of the loss. "Object," Jonathan Lear admits, "can seem cold, infelicitous. After all, Freud is talking about a person, a subject, who is loved. Still, Freud's point is that this subject, is nevertheless the object of emotion. It is a formal point." 19 Lear writes from the analyst's standpoint, but the knowledge of the lost object as object is demanded of the subject who mourns, and this perspective is available only once the work of mourning has ended. The condition of mourning is that subject and object do not exist separately; only with heartache are their bonds severed and their borders reasserted. Mourning creates the object for which it takes place, shaping and fashioning the image of the dead person by prizing the libido away. Only when this image is revealed as a detachable object can the subject know what he or she has lost. If mourning's beginning presupposes what it can only know at its end, then both narrative moments look logically incoherent. Deprived of beginning and end, the subject can hardly avoid the suspended loss of melancholia. From this perspective the pathological case is not melancholia but mourning, in laying claim to a suspicious degree of knowledge. The reflections on old Hamlet's ghost with which Specters of Marx begins allow Jacques Derrida to deconstruct the self-certainty of the narrative mourning weaves for itself. Mourning, he observes, consists in attempting "to ontologize remains, to make them present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the dead": "One has to know. One has to know it. One has to have knowledge … Nothing could be worse, for the work of mourning, than confusion or doubt: one has to know who is buried where-and it is necessary (to know-to make certain) that, in what remains of him, he remain there." 20 For Derrida, the mourner's repetitive insistence on knowing betrays a need to deny the alterity of the other. In this little ventriloquism he mimics a mourning desperate to consign its object, as an object, to the locality of the grave. Any project of asserting dominion over the other by identifying, localizing, and knowing them manifests not just a dubious metaphysics of presence, but also an ambivalence of motivation: mourning the dead coincides with wishing their death. "Let him stay there and move no more!": Derrida's paradigmatic mourner sounds less like Hamlet than his uncle, for whom mourning is "sweete and commendable" so long as it ends. 21 Hamlet "must knowe," Claudius insists, your father lost a father, That father lost, lost his, and the suruiuer bound In filliall obligation for some tearme To doe obsequious sorrowe, but to perseuer In obstinate condolement, is a course Of impious stubbornes, tis vnmanly griefe. 22 These bonds are not the unbearably strong tendrils connecting subject and object, but the tiresome "mourning duties" by which the son is "bound" to grieve, at least for some "tearme." 23 Claudius's word, so close yet so emotionally removed from "time," turns the work of mourning into a custodial sentence of affected, "obsequious" woe. Michael Neill nicely observes that for Claudius "sorrow is not something to feel, but something to 'do' … Ritual, for him, serves as a way of burying the past." 24 No wonder, then, that his stepson's gloom strikes him as obstinate perseverance. Clinging to the memory of the loved one looks like a truer attachment to the dead king than accepting the already-beckoning substitute sitting on the throne.
Despite his argument's charms, something in Derrida's prosopopeia sounds conveniently absolute. The antithesis between knowledge and "confusion or doubt" is too static to countenance that the road of knowledge may simultaneously be the way of doubt, even despair. Doubt, after all, is not confusion: though the latter bespeaks a melancholic purposelessness, the former may be an essential moment of knowing. In Mourning Becomes the Law, Gillian Rose defends the principle of mourning, and the corresponding desire to know, against an apparently inevitable melancholia. "Instead of producing a work," she writes, "this self-inhibited mourning produces a play, the Trauerspiel, the interminable mourning play and lament, of post-modernity." 25 Refusing both Freud's neat terminological doublet and Derrida's triumphant deconstruction, Rose insists that mourning's work is "difficult but not interminable; beginnings may be made in the middle."
26 Knowledge in Derrida's description is already reified, a thing one "has" and "has to have." Without the process of know-ing, though, the "bare result" of knowledge is, in G. W. F. Hegel's words, "the corpse which has left the guiding tendency behind it." 27 For Rose, mourning consists not in making remains present, but in making them present. Her critique finds in deconstruction something like that skepticism described by Hegel, which "only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results"; while this skepticism lies in wait for anything new to hurl into the "empty abyss," mourning fails again and again to know its object as it works through its store of memories, but fails determinately each time. 28 The emphasis falls less on what knowledge acquires than on the purposive activity-what Rose calls "activity beyond activity"-of knowing. 29 Hegel's knowing corresponds intimately to mourning's work, a purposive activity that must have at least the formal glimmer of an end, however remote. That it takes place in the world, according to and against the terms of a larger social reality, is what makes Rose repeatedly emphasize mourning's political aspect. This activity characterizes Hieronimo's path of grief, maintaining as it does that synthesis of mourning, knowing, and vengeance so common on the Renaissance stage, with one denouement for all three. Mourning is prohibited by the undisclosed author of Horatio's death, an aspect of the loss that remains unconscious. Only Hieronimo can perform the piecemeal work that brings him to knowledge of the murder and-by the logic of his earlier couplet-action against its perpetrators. The body he bears offstage in the scene examined above remains unburied until, in a muchimitated legerdemain, it reappears as the climax of Hieronimo's drama: "See heere my shew, looke on this spectacle" (IV.iv.89). In its echo of the "murdrous spectacle" of the bloody bower (II.v.9), "spectacle" here indicates verbally this scene's correspondence with the first sight of Horatio's body, as though Hieronimo answers the unresolved horror of that earlier moment with a sort of scenic rhyme. The presentation of his son's body is Hieronimo's way of reassembling the lost object; his drama is a kind of funeral rite, which, like all ritual (as Lacan writes) mediates the gap opened up by mourning. 30 The play he produces turns out to be a work after all, acting in earnest the retribution it seems to show: with revenge "perform'd," he sighs, "my hart is satisfied" (IV.iv.129).
Whether Hieronimo's mourning does indeed become the law is, of course, one of the vexed critical problems of The Spanish Tragedy, a discussion too large for the bounds of this article. 31 A verdict of sorts is proffered by Don Andrea's ghost, who applauds these "spectacles to please my soule" with an act of legal and critical judgment (IV.v.12). Hieronimo's revenge elicits-from a play that begins with a series of adjourned decisions, and from the very subject of those proceedings-an adjudication on the various ghosts it has produced. He provides some satisfaction to Andrea, who offers a similar satisfaction in return; an affinity is finally established between the events of the play and their supernatural frame. For Rose, law is no less complex than mourning, and she never promises that mourning will win justice, only that its activity implies a commitment to knowing and changing the injustice of the present. Revenge is here, perhaps, the bad side of Rose's law-making mourning, an activity whose right remains uncertain even as it brings about the last judgment of the play.
Given how conspicuous the ghost of Andrea remains throughout, it is at once surprising and understandable that Horatio, Andrea's quasi surrogate, never returns to demand his own revenge from Hieronimo. Instead, he almost appears to Isabella, who is powerless to answer his call to justice: "See, where his Ghoast solicites with his wounds / Reuenge on her that should reuenge his death" (IV.ii. . No editor has ever credited Isabella's vision with another Enter Ghost; despite her command to "See," the apparition probably remains as private as is the Ghost's entrance to Hamlet in his mother's closet. In mourning, writes Laurence A. Rickels, the "inner topography of the lost object must be reassembled outside the mourner in the form of funerary rites and monuments addressed to the idealized dead. Otherwise, live burial in some internal vault must result for both living and dead." 32 With The Spanish Tragedy in mind, Derrida's earlier thesis might be revised: nothing could be worse for mourning than that it could be denied the very possibility of coming to know. This possibility is available for some of the world's inhabitants more than for others. Like others whose "vnmanly" grief finds no expression, Isabella is buried alive with her son in the spectral gloaming of Derrida's Trauerspiel. She passes the ghost's petition onto her husband, the Knight Marshall: "Hieronimo, make haste to see thy sonne" (IV.ii.26). But only she can see him, for the same reason she cannot answer his call to vengeance: in her frantic but purposeless activity, she inhabits this spectral realm together with her son. Her mourning is a priori unable to become the law. She is merely "scited" (IV.ii.27), summoned as a subsidiary witness in this judicial ritual. The ghost she hears calls her to a second vengeance, the sort of retribution that Freud associates particularly with melancholics, who "avenge themselves … along the detour of self-punishment" (p. 211). She kills herself.
II
Mourning is a question of parts and wholes. In all its dialectical eccentricity, it nonetheless conducts its piecemeal work in the hope of ending. Without the promise of an active, subjective redress, reserved in this play for Hieronimo, mourning cedes to the melancholic shuttling of Isabella's endless woe: "And none but I bestirre me-to no ende" (IV.ii.34). The turn this article now makes, to the corpus of Thomas Kyd, can hardly be less speculative than its object. Lukas Erne has argued cogently for moving beyond The Spanish Tragedy to recover "a dramatic oeuvre that, subjected to critical scrutiny in its entirety, gives a fuller picture" of Kyd's importance. 33 The borders of that oeuvre are hotly contested: since Erne's work, others have added and subtracted further plays, in whole or in part.
34 By contrast, little attention has been paid to two anthologies printed in 1600 that include extracts by Kyd alongside other Elizabethan poets. Marshaling their material under commonplace headings, these anthologies represent one of the writer's more evocative afterlives, reflecting formally the concerns with loss and mourning so conspicuous in The Spanish Tragedy. Both received their impetus from a circle gathered loosely around John Bodenham. Bel-vedére, or, The Garden of the Muses is more directly connected, bearing a dedication to Bodenham and announcing itself as the latest in what critics have termed the "Wits" series. 35 Edited by Anthony Munday, it comprises 4,482 quotations of one or two lines each, stitched together under headings into a cento of commonplaces. For Erne, Bel-vedére offers testimony of contemporary taste according to which The Spanish Tragedy-the third-most quoted play in the anthology-can be defended against its urbane Elizabethan detractors. "From the very beginning," he concludes, "opinions on the quality of Kyd's dramatic language seem to have differed." 36 In addition, Bel-vedére excites Erne for the promise of what hidden works might lie beneath its surface. The anthology offers a list of authors from which its flowers are taken, but coyly refrains from connecting its quotations with any particular author: "although we are tantalizingly close to writings by Kyd," Erne speculates, "they cannot be identified as his." 37 Curiously, Erne shows little enthusiasm for the other anthology of 1600, Englands Parnassus, which attaches to its flowers the names of their authors. How this work relates to Bel-vedére is uncertain. Two of the former volume's printers, Nicholas Ling and Cuthbert Burbie, and its probable compiler, Allott, are closely associated with Bodenham's "Wits" series: Ling edited the first volume, Burbie published the second, and Allott edited the third. 38 Celeste Turner Wright suggests that Englands Parnassus was thrown together as a rival to both Bel-vedére and England's Helicon, citing as evidence the "woefully careless" printing and composition of this "mere book of quotations, full of errors and bearing every sign of haste." 39 One might expect a more charitable reception from critics eager for traces of Kyd. Of twenty-three quotations attributed to him, two belong to no known works. This fact must admittedly be qualified. Allott's ascriptions of authorship are frequently overconfident, even in the case of Kyd: the longest fragment, which had yet to be identified at the time of Frederick S. Boas's work on Kyd, was reassigned to Joshua Sylvester less than a decade later by Charles Crawford. 40 Erne's assessment is nevertheless surprisingly brusque: the excerpts, "adding up to five lines, may of course still be Kyd's, but even if they are, they do not add much to his canon." 41 Here are the fragments themselves:
Time is a bondslaue to eternitie. Tho. Kyd
Honour indeede, and all things yeeld to death, (Vertue excepted) which alone suruiues, And liuing toyleth in an earthlie gaile, At last to be extol'd in heauens high ioyes. T. Kyd 42 It is worth separating out the cumulative disappointments in Erne's final phrase. To begin with, at just five lines, they-literally-do not add much. More importantly, these lines do not add much to Kyd's canon: as commonplaces, they might have come from anywhere. The reason they survived is not because they are representative of his writing, but because they are not; they lay claim instead to the universality of a timeless truth. That both quotations address the subject of time is peculiarly fitting. The sole survivors of Kyd's lost works are lines promising that "all things yeeld to death"; amidst the ravages of time these excerpts pronounce, they stand as their own counterexamples. In meting out death to all in common, these phrases acquire an invulnerability as commonplaces, winning an exemption from the fate they promise to all. They have survived by condemning all else, including the works in which they appeared, to death. One way of understanding this paradox, perhaps, is through the vertiginous turn at the end of Walter Benjamin's book on the Trauerspiel, where the heap of ruins to which allegory has reduced the world reveals less the "ideal" of "allegorical contemplation" than its "limit": "The bleak confusion of Golgotha … is not just a symbol of the emptiness of all human existence. In it transience is not signified or allegorically represented, so much as it itself signifies, displayed as allegory. As the allegory of resurrection. Ultimately in the baroque signs of death, the direction of allegorical reflection is reversed; on the second part of its wide arc it returns, to redeem." 43 Rather than representing the basic truth of all allegories, transience at this moment becomes allegorical: transience is itself transient. The most vehement denunciations of the world win in their thoroughgoing negativity the privilege of survival by representing the unrepresentable possibility of an eternal otherwise.
For studies devoted to particular authors, the commonplace is a stumbling block, because what characterizes it is precisely its authorless quality. According to Erasmus, it shares this quality with its near neighbor the proverb, the genus toward which every sententia tends. The universal, binding character of both, whatever their origins, makes them seem "to have fallen from heaven rather than to have come from men." 44 In what William Barker calls the "unauthored language" of Erasmus's proverb, the death of the author is the birth of the reader: "The absence of a specific author allows us to use it as ours, to use it to situate ourselves in language itself, not in language with a particular source." 45 What matters for the Adages, Barker suggests, is less their pasts than their futures at the hands of Erasmus's readers. The sententia, likewise, is a cited phrase. By means of the occasionally literal quotation marks placed around it, it can, writes Derrida, "break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable." 46 Schooled by Derrida, recent bibliographic studies have focused on the creation effected by textual collaging and fragmentation. In a recent journal special issue dedicated to "The Renaissance Collage," Juliet Fleming argues vehemently for the "positivity of cutting." For critics who emphasize "the destruction of the whole from which the part is cut," she recommends a closer reading of Derrida: "in order to reconceptualize the cut we need to stop thinking in wholes." 47 Along with the whole, the notions of the source and the origin must be forsworn. What would a mark be like, asks Derrida, "whose origins would not get lost along the way?" For Derrida, every phrase is a commonplace by virtue of its iterability; it is both there and not there wherever it appears, existing within but not belonging to a text. His words seem to resonate especially with an early modern culture regularly described as an aggregator's world. Sixteenth-century readers, writes Mary Thomas Crane, were taught "to value texts that contained the greatest store of matter in the form of moral aphorisms, proverbs, similitudes, and striking idioms"; texts were treated as "a system of interchangeable fragments," even as "containers" of such fragments. 49 All texts exhibit the internal division that characterizes anthologies, the provisional accumulation of matter gathered only to be dispersed to infinite destinations. Anthologies, then, appear to entrust their contents to their readers. "In general," Adam Smyth writes of seventeenth-century miscellanies, "readers seem comfortable with the notion of poems as units which circulated freely, generally devoid of constricting definitions like author and origin. Given readers' apparent interest in appropriating poems or parts of poems for their own purposes, it seems likely that potential future contexts rather than the original circumstances of composition interested them." 50 Against this picture of radically unconstricted quotations, Englands Parnassus offers a different view of the anthology. Smyth astutely identifies the "overt seriousness of purpose" of the "Wits" volumes: compared to later anthologies, "[t]heir attitude to their poems were [sic] more deferential, distant, learned." 51 The contents of Englands Parnassus are not free, unassigned property: each flower-even one-liners of the most conventional content-is tagged with the name of its author. This anthology catches the commonplace at a point along the way where its origins are not quite lost. Every excerpt is offered with the proviso that it has a past as well as a future. This anthology figures a more dialectical relation between the authors it excerpts and the readers for whom it excerpts them. On the one hand, it denies the essential particularity of the quotations it collects. The commonplace statement included in any work was always on loan from somewhere else, and it speaks with a tone of universal timelessness that escapes any particular setting. On the other hand, it reminds its readers that commonplaces do not fall from heaven but require for their ubiquity some especially felicitous phrasing. This paradox is at work in Erasmus's preferred definition for the adage, as "a saying in popular use, remarkable for some shrewd and novel turn." 52 What the writer utters is a timeless truth, but it acquires its truthful resonance through the novelty of its wording. What-ever future contexts it may acquire, each quotation in Englands Parnassus preserves the mark of some definite circumstances of composition, looking back to the whole from which it was taken.
Although its extracts are nameless, Bel-vedére reminds its readers of these past lives in its prefatory epistle: "that euery one may be fully satisfied concerning this Garden, that no man … can arrogate to his owne deseruing those things which haue been deriued from so many rare and ingenious spirits; I haue set down both how, whence, and where these flowres had their first springing, till thus they were drawne togither into the Muses Garden, that euery ground may challenge his owne, each plant his particular, and no one be iniuried in the iustice of his merit." 53 It seems inappropriate to describe this anthologist's treatment of his material as appropriation. The warning against any single man appropriating what belongs to "so many" others cuts both ways: the writer cannot claim to own a general truth, nor can the reader ignore its derivation. This epistle negotiates the competing claims surrounding its contents' ownership with legalistic caution, lest the "iustice" of any party be impugned in the anthology. Further, claiming "those things" as one's own is more dubious because they are not entirely things. Their materiality is still invested with a sense of spirit. Though they appear happily grafted into a new "Muses Garden," these flowers still answer to the ghostly voice from beneath the earth where they had their "first springing." However self-grounded these sententiae may seem, the setting in which they were once planted claims them nevertheless as its own. The place of the commonplace is haunted ground.
The flowers of Englands Parnassus are not replanted, but-according to the etymology of "anthology"-picked and gathered. 54 The dedicatory sonnet to Sir Thomas Mounson, placed at the volume's opening, offers Allott a chance to reflect on the anthologist's task. Despite insisting that "they must liue for euer" as guarantors of his dedicatee's immortality, he acknowledges how his flowers' lives are rendered precarious in the taking. "I pickt these flowers of Learning from their stem": in one reading, Allott displays a personal pride ("I pickt") at having located these "flowers"-fairest examples-"of Learning." 55 But amid this celebration there remains the awkward question of the "stem": another reading could emphasize not "I" and "Learning," but the fact of having "pickt these flowers … from their stem"-and would thus reveal the possible unhappiness of the anthologist's act. T. Kyd 56 Those six dashes point back to Brutus, who speaks these lines in Kyd's Cornelia as he considers how to check an increasingly imperious Caesar. Brutus hesitates between this patriotic statement and a no less emphatic expression of personal love for Caesar: the line begins "I loue, I loue him deerely. But the loue / That …" 57 The assertion of a general good attracts the anthologist searching for such noble commonplaces; these lines are even marked out in Kyd's text as commonplaces, printed with the marginal quotation marks by which early modern stationers regularly drew their readers' attention to passages worth taking. 58 But the metrical disfigurement of its first line in Englands Parnassus strongly invokes the sense of a loss withdrawn from consciousness. Allott gives his reader the generality without setting or speaker, but leaves enough evidence of his excerpting activity to set the mind working, imagining every particularity of circumstances that has been excluded. As important as what is chosen is what is not: the stem, captured typographically by these dashes, on which this flower looked good enough to pick, but without which it looks altogether different. This is the impulse that makes anthologizing seem irresistible but ill-fated. A flower looks too good to leave behind, but once picked, it begins to die.
III
The flowers gathered in the anthology are preserved by being removed from a stem that is left for lost. But the bond between an excerpt and where it came from is not so easily forgotten. Loss is written into the form of anthologies like Englands Parnassus. Like a love bereft of its object, continuing to mourn despite the fresh contexts and usages already beckoning, the fragment is reluctant to abandon its position in the former work, for all that this position was always ambivalent. What bibliographic accounts of the anthology tend to omit, this article suggests, is the period of mourning occasioned by the anthologist's act: the newly severed part preserves a memory of a whole in which it once appeared. The form of the anthology requires critics to think through both these moments, rather than asserting the primacy of the part at the expense of the whole. Just as it is the work of mourning that creates the object for which it mourns, so it may be the excerption of a passage that creates that whole in retrospect-the spirit, as Bel-vedére describes it, that continues to haunt the thing. The excerpts in Englands Parnassus bear witness to the violence of the anthologist's cut. Not all are as marked as those considered in this article. Some excerpts are more thoroughly unmoored than others: in the parallel vocabulary Freud's essay provides, some are further in mourning's work than others. In the anthology, fragments themselves are challenged, as it were, to stop thinking in wholes and to engage instead with substitute settings. These remnants of Kyd's lost works manifest what Freud describes as the "understandable tendency … to counter this" (p. 204). But their settings are gone, presumably for good; they cannot know where they have come from or what they have lost.
As words of consolation are proverbially difficult to find for someone in grief, so the critic is faced with a dilemma, caught between passing over these fragments in (near) silence, like Erne, or saying too much, like the nineteenth-century editor Josef Schick. While admitting that they "may be merely stray wreckage from some hopelessly lost work," Schick deduced from one of Kyd's passages a possible moment in the most celebrated of Kyd's lost works, the ur-Hamlet. The fragment comes, he guesses, from "a chorus towards the end of the play, denouncing the tyrant Claudius, whose 'cursed court swells with blood and incest,' and who, 'for a pastime, whets on the fury of his peers'-Laertes and Hamlet." 59 Unfortunately, this is the quotation that Crawford would shortly reassign to Sylvester. Schick's "fit of fanciful conjecture," and its unhappy event, is held up as a cautionary tale by later scholars. 60 But Schick writes in the hope-however small-that what is lost might be recovered. His endeavor to imagine a whole for these parts is predictably doomed-the virtue of the commonplace is to stand anywhere, in any work. Nevertheless, that the ur-Hamlet might have attracted Allott's attention is intriguingly plausible, given Thomas Nashe's testimony of the earlier play: "English Seneca read by candle light yeeldes manie good sentences, as Bloud is a begger, and so foorth: and if you intreate him faire in a frostie morning, he will afford you whole Hamlets, I should say handfulls of tragical speaches." 61 Schick's impulse to recreate the work surrounding these fragments-to accomplish the work of mourning they leave so tantalizingly abrupted-is futile but irresistible: on the evidence of Nashe's wry parapraxis, the ur-Hamlet would have offered anthologists whole handfuls of poetic flowers.
On the one hand, Erne's silence leaves untouched the suggestive parallels between Isabella's melancholia in The Spanish Tragedy and the mute mournfulness of these shards of "stray wreckage." On the other, Schick misrecognizes these excerpts as more richly expressive of their setting than they were. Like Brutus's commonplace on the commonwealth, these fragments are the coagulations of universality in what was once a process of dramatic thought. Steering between these alternatives, this article has argued that the remains of Kyd's works reflect, in their form, the loss and grieving that are the material of his plays. The loss represented in the anthology is double and mutual. The excerpt has lost its whole, and the notional whole has lost this excerpt; each is both the subject and the object of grief, and only the work of mourning allows them to be separated as cleanly as Fleming hopes. With a quotation from a known work, whole and part are equally constituted by the critical task of coming to know the path a quotation has taken to come to this state. Deprived of this, mourning gives way to melancholia-the fate not just of Isabella, but also of Kyd's lost works. The life of an anthology's flowers is an arrested existence not unlike Isabella's "endles woe." Almost no text could better capture the strange quality of this life than that second unclaimed fragment attributed to Kyd in Englands Parnassus, which reads uncannily like a commentary on its own preservation:
Honour indeede, and all things yeeld to death, (Vertue excepted) which alone suruiues, And liuing toyleth in an earthlie gaile, At last to be extol'd in heauens high ioyes.
Sheltering in parentheses from the catastrophe of mortal things, virtue "alone suruiues." This is the quotation's fate too, which under the heading "Vertue" is excepted from the doom pronounced on the lost work in which it appeared. 62 There is nothing transcendent about this afterlife Kyd describes. "And liuing," virtue alone wins a miserable prolongation of being, battered by the earthly storm. This melancholic limbo is the curious preservation of the anthology. The fragment cannot know where it came from, even as virtue "toyleth … to be extol'd," waiting passively for an uncertain redemption to rescue it from joyless endurance. The gap on the page between the excerpted fragment and its author's name is exactly the interim that cannot be crossed. Where it came from, and whether it is Kyd's at all, are questions whose answers, in Freud's words, are "withdrawn from consciousness." Caught in this repetitive, melancholic space, the critic remains, to use Erne's suggestively infernal phrase, "tantalizingly close." Toiling in their earthly storm, these fragments cannot achieve what Benjamin describes as the moment "all earthly things are gathered in together and exalted before being consigned to their end." 63 Unable to know how to complete their mourning, their survival is as unending as is The Spanish Tragedy: "For heere, though death hath end their miserie, / Ile there begin their endles Tragedie" (IV.v. . 
